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Tale of Two Green Communities: Energy Informatics 
and Social Competition on Energy Conservation 
Behavior 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores whether providing information on energy consumption is effective in changing energy 
consumption behavior.  More specifically, in groups with collectivist culture, energy informatics have a significant 
role in inducing active participation and engagement in energy conservation efforts. Using data collected from 
energy monitoring competitions conducted in student residence halls of a university, I find that energy competition 
has positive influence in reducing energy consumption for cohesive dorms, whereas it has adverse effect for less 
cohesive ones .  The findings of the study indicate suggest that the role of information on the energy saving is 
conditional on existing culture  in communities.  I discuss the managerial implications of the findings. 
Keywords  
Sustainability, Green IS, Energy Informatics, Social Competition, Intergroup Competition. 
INTRODUCTION 
While the concerns towards environmental sustainability are growing, the progress in inducing sustainable practices 
across individuals, firms, and nations is seen as a vital challenge. Lack of appropriate information is becoming a 
constraint to educate and instill the energy conservation behavior.  Policy makers are exploring plans for mounting 
national level awareness drives, and business leaders are looking at opportunities to instill Green behaviors in their 
firms. For example, several companies have transitioned into using eco-efficient laptops across the organization. 
Similarly, government has initiated programs such as tax credits for adopting Green technology such as Energystar-
compliant appliances.  
Prior studies suggest that energy informatics (Watson et al. 2010) can play a vital role in building awareness and 
instilling green behavior.  Existing studies focus on creating incentives at individual level, and adopting strategies 
for dissemination of information on energy savings across the organization can help in coordinating sustainable 
practices.  Other studies suggest that instead of monetary incentives, creating social norms through information-
based programs might lead to positive results. For instance, empowering recycling through community awareness 
leads to effective changes in energy consumption behavior (Schultz 1999; Cialdini 2004).  A few pilot programs for 
utilities have included a neighborhood use information in the monthly energy bill for consumers as reducing energy 
use through social comparison (e.g. OPOWER company provide software platform to utilities to generate such 
monthly statement, Allcot 2010).   
Against the role of instilling energy saving behavior through incentives, prior studies suggest that rewarding 
individual behavior may not lead to any reduction in energy consumption (McCalley 2003).  Further, it is argued 
that people fail to adopt such straightforward measures, even though doing so could lead to positive results in 
reducing energy consumption (Granade et al. 2009). Although there may be multiple reasons (Jaffe and Stavins 
1994), it is clear that monetary incentives alone are not sufficient to sustain consumer participation.  Therefore, 
empirical evidence on results of using energy informatics is a gap in the existing literature. Further, incorporating 
the socio-technical systems approach (Dwyer, 2010) using feedback loops to large-scale groups towards sustainable 
practices remains an unexplored area of research.  
This study explores the role of energy informatics on engaging social groups to conserve energy through social 
competition.  I used the context of dorm level competitions for energy conservation conducted during 2008 – 2010.   
I collected data on daily energy consumption, and studied the configurations of the dorms that were participating in 
the competition. I divided data samples into two groups, based on their configurations: i.e. Greek houses with high 
level of cohesion among members, and generic student residence halls where social norm on collectivist culture is 
relatively weak.  I find that competition is positively associated with 6.5% reduction in energy use when the 
underlying social norm is strong.  Further, in the resident halls where social norm is weak, there is an increase of 
14.2 % in energy use. The findings indicate the interplay of energy informatics and social norms toward energy 
consumption behavior.  The findings provide the managerial implications that designing appropriate energy 
informatics plan in an organization has to keep in mind the social configuration of the organization.  I conclude with 
contributions of this study and future research agenda.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theoretical framework of this study is based on the discussions around prosocial behavior and feedback 
interventions theory (FIT). I argue that prosocial behavior can be instilled through a competitive framework, where 
free-riding for energy consumption can be mitigated through availability of information on others’ behaviors. 
Further, by using feedback interventions, the means to achieve the prosocial behavior will be improved to form a 
sufficient mass of participants to enable social change to save the environment. 
Energy Conservation Behaviors and Social Competition 
Sustainable behaviors in energy conservation context are analogous to prosocial behaviors, where individuals 
engage in costly activities to benefit others or society, such as voting, volunteering, and making charitable 
contributions (Trivers 1971; Batson 1998; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003).   However, major challenge in inducing 
prosocial behavior is how to align incentives while mitigating free riding behaviors, especially in a group or 
communities where member size is large. In the context of green initiatives, individuals might not find any value in 
exerting costly effort towards energy conservation practices when they can free ride at the expense of others.  
Despite clear incentives to free-ride, many individuals continue to engage in prosocial behaviors; however, lab 
experiments have shown that with repeated interactions, such behaviors dissipate quickly (Isaac et al. 1984; Ledyard 
1995).  Without the ability to monitor member behavior or punish those who free-ride (Fehr and Gachter 2000), 
acquiring and engaging participants may be inherently a lost cause.  Therefore, a necessary condition to foster 
energy conservation behavior is to minimize free-riding by shifting the decision framework of consumers from 
“self-regarding” to “other-regarding” behaviors (Benabout and Tirole 2006). 
Extensive literature on group-based competition or tournaments has shown to increase total effort level by aligning 
incentives with group outcome.  For instance, evidences from experimental and field studies on intergroup 
competition has shown to reduce free riding in social dilemma and raise total effort levels (Erev, Bornstein and Galil 
1993). Compared to piece-rates or incentives to reward individual performance, relative performance evaluation has 
shown to raise total effort levels of agents compared to general form of contracts (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green 
and Stokey 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983; Glazer and Hassin 1988; Gradstein and Konrad 1999; Moldovanu and 
Sela 2001).  Prior studies have demonstrated that performance evaluations in the intergroup competitions have 
provided mixed results depending on the group size and number of prizes (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2003).  
Tournaments with more contestants and prizes may increase free-riding when others’ efforts are known (Fu and Lu, 
2009). Finally, the composition of the group has effect on performance; for instance, presence of high-effort 
individuals reduces total effort level of participants (Brown 2008).  
Feedback Interventions and Social Competition 
The feedback interventions theory (FIT) posits that information resulting after exerting effort can be used to gauge 
future effort level (Kluger & DeNisi 1996).  For instance, incentives to reward individual behavior may improve 
productivity of only those whose utility level exceeds that of winning likelihood.  Consequently, goal setting, locus 
of information such as task, individual, or group, can refine the quality of feedback and thus affect the effectiveness 
of incentives and subsequent performance (Pritchard et al. 1988).   
Normative feedback interventions provide useful information about what others do by informing existing social 
norm (Schultz 1999).  By comparing what others do, individuals can raise the effort level to match that of a norm.  
For instance, using surveys and messaging to a group of households in San Diego, Nolan et al. (2008) have shown 
that “descriptive norm” message works best compared to other types of feedback in participants to adopt green 
behavior.  A rationale for observing this behavior is that if sufficient members have engaged in energy saving 
behavior, average person is more likely to adopt energy saving behavior.  However, while informing what others do 
can have positive effect on bringing members close to social norm, peripheral or atypical members may defect just 
as easily (Popielarz and McPherson 1995).  
In the energy context, the positive effect of normative feedback interventions and competition has studied in the 
dorm-level energy competition in a university setting.  Whereas traditional tournament studies find research setting 
in organization context or laboratories with monetary prizes, “social” competition with “bragging rights” or social 
status as the only rewards offers more cost-efficient alternative to individual incentives.  For instance, Oberlin 
College’s energy competition displayed real-time energy use for each dorm on websites to reduce electricity use 
(Petersen et al. 2005).  In addition, the value of energy informatics in competition setting may mitigate the free-
riding behavior inherent in energy conservation efforts.  Lastly, increasing communication among members could 
establish social norm (Sutter and Strassmair 2009).   
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Two Resident Communities: Greek Houses vs. Resident Halls 
Energy saving under climate change initiatives has become the priority for many organizations to achieve the vision 
of a greener planet.  Specifically, universities have a greater role in creating awareness, educating and training next 
generation of students to become green leaders in society.  Previous studies have estimated that occupant behavior 
can control up to 50 percent of residential energy use, while the rest depends on energy demand of the buildings 
based on physical characteristics and infrastructure efficiency.  Preparing students through practice based norms 
towards energy consumption will go a long way in shaping the green leadership initiatives in the future.  
Instilling green behavior among students requires active participation and engagement. To understand how social 
competitions motivate students to learn and save energy, I compare and contrast two independent dorm competitions 
conducted at the University of Maryland, College Park.  First, the Office of Fraternity and Sorority Life (OFSL) and 
the Office of Sustainability at the University of Maryland, College Park, partnered to run Green Greek Challenge, an 
annual competition among Greek houses in the Fraternity Row.  The competition was conducted in 2009 and 2010.  
In its first year, a winning dorm received monetary prizes, whereas in the second year, social recognition and non-
monetary prizes (e.g.: tickets to Basketball games) were used to elicit student participation.  In both years, financial 
budget to support the competition remained the same.  The automated electronic monitoring systems captured daily 
energy use, and each dorm received a weekly report summarizing the amount of energy used and their current rank 
in the competition.  At the end of the 9-week period, the top ranked dorm wins prizes as well as bragging rights.   
Second, a student-initiated dorm competition was run in 2010 involving 11 North Campus student residence halls, as 
part of a national competition called Campus Conservation National (CCN) involving 39 colleges.  Although the 
competition lasted much shorter (i.e.: 3-weeks) during the first three weeks in November, both competitions used 
similar designs to increase student awareness and induce energy conservation behavior.  Because these two 
competitions differ in duration as well as having a wider involvement of other campuses for CCN, I cannot directly 
compare the results but rather contrast the differences and highlight the key insights for future consideration in 
designing social competitions to motivate students. Lastly, both competitions used multiple channels of 
communication to display weekly results using email, Facebook, website, and off-line print materials posted on the 
dorm bullet boards.  
The key findings are based on analyzing the energy use before and after each year’s competition.  The unit of 
analysis on the dependent variable is the daily energy consumption for dorms in each student community from 
September to November in each year.  By using a statistical model that predicts daily energy demand for each dorm 
based on changes in the daily average temperature and the occupancy level, I am able to quantify the effect that the 
social competition had on energy conservation behavior.  I also compare the changes in energy level of participating 
dorms (Greek houses and North Campus student residence halls) against 18 dorms in the South Campus during same 
time periods as control. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
I obtained data on total daily energy consumption (ENERGY-kWh) via ITRON, an automated metering system 
installed at each dorm to take various energy measurements such as electricity and water records at fifteen minute 
and hour interval, respectively.  My approach in data analysis is two-fold: first, I identify the main factors that 
accurately capture daily energy use level for each dorm.  Next, based on the predicted values of energy use, I can 
quantify the effectiveness of the program by comparing the energy use before and after the competition. 
First, I identify daily average temperature and occupancy level (i.e.: number of occupants in a house on a given day) 
as two main factors to predict total daily energy use for each dorm on the Fraternity Row.  In other words, I can 
accurately estimate the daily energy demand by capturing daily average temperature and occupancy level.  For 
instance, it is reasonable to assume that higher average temperature on a given day would influence occupants to use 
more air conditioning or fan, thereby increasing energy demand, whereas lower occupancy on weekends would 
reduce energy consumption level due to many students going out to party.  I obtained the recorded average daily 
temperature from the weather database and used the day of the week (e.g.: Sunday) as dummy variables to explain 
most of the variances (77%) in the actual data.  This simple model enables us to capture quantitatively the 
effectiveness of the GGC, by comparing the daily energy use before and after the competition.   
The accuracy of this model depends on whether the change in each house’s daily energy demand due to the main 
predictors is consistent over time.  In simple terms, I need to make sure that the temperature changes and occupancy 
level across time has a linear trend.  As Figure 1 shows, daily temperature between September and November 
declines in a linear fashion.  To adjust daily fluctuation of energy consumption due to the day of the week (i.e.: 
weekends) as well as due to holidays (e.g.: Thanksgiving), I use dummy variables.  The result of our model thus fits 
most of the observed data.  Figure 2 compares the predicted and actual daily average energy use. 
Next, I quantify the effect of the competition by comparing the energy use before and after the competition.  If I use 
pre-competition period (September) in 2008 as baseline, I can compare the relative change in energy reduction level 
during competition period for 2009-2010.  By comparing the differences, I can quantify the effect of the competition 
on the energy consumption behavior.  For instance, a house in the Fraternity Row consumed 454 kWh per day 
before the competition in 2008.  During the competition period in 2009 and 2010, there was 2.9% and 9.6% 
reduction in energy consumption level, respectively.   
However, my interpretation of this result may be biased because the differences in average temperature during this 
time period or the change in composition of the student cohorts was responsible for the reduced level of energy 
consumption.  For instance, Figure 3 shows that during 2009-2010, average daily energy use pre-competition was 
much lower in 2008, perhaps indicating that the reduction may not be solely due to competition.  In order to 
accurately assess the positive impact of the competition, I need a “control” or expected energy use had there been no 
competition. 
To estimate the expected energy consumption without the influence of the competition, I choose a group of 
“control” dorms in the South Campus.  Because these dorms are located in the near vicinity of the houses in the 
Fraternity Row, each dorm is subject to the same temperature changes as well as having the same change in day of 
the week.  There are total of 18 dorms in South Campus, and I used the same procedure and analysis for the 
comparison.  Using this control, I have a more robust estimate of the competition effect on the reduction in the 
energy consumption level (Figure 4).   
More formally, the estimation model is as follows (1): 
 ln(ENERGY)it = a + b1COMP(y)t +b2LOC* COMP(y)t + b3TAVGt + b4jDOW + b5YEAR + e, (1) 
where COMP=competition type (GGC, CCN); LOC=South Campus; TAVG=daily average temperature; DOW=day 
of the week; YEAR=year dummy (See Table 1). 
I used fixed effects model to estimate the key parameter of interest.  The fixed effects estimation is useful in panel 
data because only time-variant factors affect the change in energy use.  This assumption may be reasonable given 
that energy demand is primarily affected by temperature change and occupancy level (Cartalis 2001).  Alternatively, 
a random effects model may be used to estimate the effect of competition on energy use incorporating dorm capacity 
and other factors that vary in cross-section.  A Hasuman test to choose between the fixed effects and random effects 
supported my decision.  However, the results do not change.   
The Table 2 shows the results contrasting the effect of social competition on energy use.  In 2010, a house in the 
Fraternity Row reduced 26.7% in energy use compared to a non-participating South dorm, whereas in 2009, this 
figure is 26.4%.  If I relax the differences in student cohorts over each year, I can directly attribute the competition 
effect in 2009 and 2010 to be 6.5% and 6.2%, respectively, to 2008 figure.  In other words, if I were to implement a 
GGC-like competition across campus, a typical dorm would expect on average 6% reduction in energy use above 
and beyond temperature decline and change in occupancy over the course of the semester. 
However, the effect of CCN on North Campus has opposite result.  In 2010, a resident hall in the North Campus 
increased energy use by 8.9% during 3-week competition than a South Campus dorm.  Comparing the energy use in 
same time period during 2009, a North Campus experienced 5.3% decrease in energy use.  These two figures 
represent 14.2% swing in year-over-year in energy use in the opposite direction of expected change due to social 
competition. 
Lastly, this model incorporating control dorms is not without its limitations.  I assume that a typical South Campus 
is affected by temperature and day of the week in the same manner as a house in the Fraternity Row.  Although our 
model has a reasonable fit predicting the daily energy use (63%), a reduced fit indicates that a South Campus may 
not be a good enough control.  For instance, a South Campus dorm varies in size more so than a Fraternity Row 
house.  In addition, a typical resident in a South Campus dorm may not be as close to others as in the Fraternity Row 
house.  Together, these differences may change the size of the effect in either positive or negative direction; 
although it is reasonable assume that the bias is likely to be downwards. 
In summary, key findings are as follows: 
GGC Competition 
• In 2010, a Fraternity Row house consumed 26.7% less energy during competition than a South Campus 
resident hall, compared to 20.2% in 2008, representing 6.5% Year-over-Year reduction 
• In 2009, a Fraternity Row house consumed 26.4% less energy during competition than a South Campus 
resident hall, compared to 20.2% in 2008, representing 6.2% Year-over-Year reduction 
CCN Competition 
• In 2010, a North Campus resident hall consumed 8.9% more energy during competition than a South 
Campus dorm, compared to 5.4% less energy consumed in 2009, representing 14.3% upswing Year-over-
Year energy use 
 
DISCUSSION 
I set out to study the impact of energy informatics on energy conservation behavior using social competition to 
increase effort level of students in saving energy in dorms.  The role of energy use information may drive behavioral 
change by increasing learning and motivation to participate.  In addition, displaying observable performance of other 
groups engages the power of social comparison to further raise the total effort level of participants. However, 
revealing group performance information may have adverse effect on increasing free riding behavior if a member in 
a losing group realizes that the likelihood of winning a competition is small, thereby decreasing the margin of return 
for effort exerted.  Counterbalancing this free riding behavior may be mitigated through social monitoring of 
member behaviors or use communication to increase solidarity within communities (Sutter and Strassmair 2009).   
The choice of what information to disclose to engage consumers towards sustainable practices must consider the 
underlying relationships among members in the existing community.  If there is strong ties among members in a 
community, feedback interventions on group performance may enhance total effort level, whereas providing energy 
informatics in a less cohesive community may unintentionally increase energy use.   For instance, an average 
member may falsely assume that the community is exerting sufficient effort, or that she may discover that the cost of 
effort outweighs the potential benefit received.   
The main contribution of this paper is that effectiveness of energy informatics on reducing energy conservation 
behavior depends on existing social norm.  In communities where strong collectivist culture exists, members of 
communities can be re-directed to align their behaviors with desired pro-community outcome.  I find that in Greek 
whose members exhibit stronger affinity towards other members within their community, the social competition has 
positive influence in reducing energy consumption, whereas in North Campus resident halls, energy consumption 
increased.   
Second, I use an estimation model using expected daily energy demand of each dorm using the occupancy level and 
temperature change as two main predictors of change in energy use.  By sampling a temporal period in which the 
temperature decline is uniform, I was able to use a linear model to estimate and predict the outcome with strong fit.  
The fixed effects model eliminates the time-invariant factors and enables testing the effect of key variables.  The 
usefulness of this model to evaluate the effectiveness of sustainable programs may be generalized in other contexts. 
Before we discuss the implications of this finding and future research agenda, there are several limitations of this 
study.  First, the social competition “treatment” is not same across two communities, thereby making direct 
comparisons of the result not valid.  An ideal field experiment should have the same exogenous shock applied in the 
two contrasting environment; however, due to constraints in the design, I can only infer the effect of social 
competition as two separate illustrative cases.  In addition, the difference in competition design such as duration may 
affect the findings in that beyond 3-week period of the CCN, the community members might have increased 
learning and achieve similar types of energy conservation as the members in the Greek community.  In addition, 
Greek community members have two years of competition that could bias the result.  While social learning 
difference could certainly exist, energy saving behavior is strongest at the beginning of the contest, which indicates 
that members' effort spirals downward to minimum level with repeated exposure to competition.  In either case, this 
study's findings for potential energy reduction is likely to be more conservative.  However, I cannot completely rule 
out this alternative biasing the findings. 
Second, the unit of analysis is at the group level, so generalizing the findings to the individual level may not be 
feasible.  Although, the effect of social competition on average member may be positive, the increase dispersion of 
individual behaviors commonly observed in tournaments could be the main driver of increase in energy use, 
especially in a large community, where incentive to free ride is high.  To control for the existing relationships in the 
community, a measure of community cohesiveness such as network density may strengthen the findings.  
Alternatively, a future research design can incorporate individual behavior as dependent variable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The emerging technologies in energy informatics such as smart grids, monitoring devices, and other Web 2.0 
technology such as online social networks make it easy to reach and organize masses of individuals through peer-to-
peer network.  However, a care must be taken on the potential benefit as well as the adverse effects of using 
information to induce behavioral change.  Just as easily as technology can recruit members and establish Green 
norm, it can disintegrate existing communities rapidly as well. 
Based on the results obtained in this study, social competition can be an effective strategy to reduce energy 
consumption behavior of students in the dorms each year. However, where social norm is weak, energy informatics 
may contribute to increase in energy consumption. Lastly, employing “social” incentives is more effective than 
monetary prizes in engaging students.  The findings provide first order evidence that monitoring and incentive based 
competitions are successful towards energy reduction behavior.  Second, contrasting two different communities 
highlights the importance of keeping a community close as a necessary requirement.  A future improvement of the 
competition could leverage information technology such as social network to reach more people while keeping the 
community close.  
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Figure 1: Daily Average Temperature (F) – September-November 
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Figure 2: Daily Average Electricity Use (kWh)  
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Figure 3: Daily Energy Use (kWh) - Before/After 
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Figure 4: Daily Energy Use (kWh) - Before/After – Frat only vs. Full 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables List   
TREAT Whether a dorm experienced competition (1=Greek/North Campus, 0=South Campus) 
COMP Competition period 
TAVG Daily Average Temperature (F) 
DOW Day of the Week (Sunday-Monday) 
YEAR Academic Calendar Year 
HOLIDAY Thanksgiving period 
 
Table 1: List of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects Regression     
  Frat North Campus 
  b/se b/se 
TREAT*COMP     
2010 -0.267*** 0.089*** 
  (0.008) (0.018) 
2009 -0.264*** -0.054*** 
  (0.008) (0.018) 
2008 -0.202***   
  (0.008)   
COMP     
2010 -0.043*** 0.055*** 
  (0.007) (0.013) 
2009 0.031*** 0.087*** 
  (0.006) (0.012) 
2008 0.022***   
  (0.007)   
TAVG 0.008*** 0.011*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
DOW     
Monday 0.029*** 0.022** 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
Tuesday 0.031*** 0.007 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
Wednesday 0.020*** -0.003 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
Thursday 0.033*** 0.018 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
Friday 0.015*** 0.008 
  (0.005) (0.011) 
Saturday -0.062*** -0.079*** 
  (0.005) (0.010) 
_cons 5.752*** 6.000*** 
  (0.013) (0.020) 
R2-within 0.63 0.35 
N 8,668 5,197 
*Other Control Variables – Year and Holidays are not shown for formatting purposes 
Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression 
 
